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In China, the transformation of economy and the reform of the labor system since
the 1980s have seen a large number of collective labor disputes, yet the scale and
intensity of these disputes have been effectively controlled. A trend has been
observed that those disputes are more and more individualized. Especially since the
new century, the size and frequency of collective labor disputes accepted by
governmental arbitration institutions gradually decreased. What factors reduced the
number of collective labor disputes that were handled by formal dispute resolution
channels? Based on provincial-level panel data from 1999 to 2011 and quantitative
analysis, this paper finds that in the transition years, the Chinese state actively
strengthened various mechanisms to mediate labor disputes, which absorbed and
defused the collective struggles of workers. However, these mediations significantly
reduced only the scale of the collective labor disputes rather than the frequency of
their occurrence. High selectivity of mediation accounts for this phenomenon:
authorities focused primarily on the prevention of large-scale disputes and neglected
individual or small-scale disputes. This finding responds theoretically to the discussion
of the absence of massive labor movements during China’s transition and conceptually
highlights the mediator role of the Chinese state, which flexibly eased the struggles of
workers. Empirically, this work also discusses why the absolute number of labor
disputes in the transition remained stubbornly high and why they were consistently
mediated but unsolved.
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Two trends occurred in the collective disputes accepted by labor arbitration institu-
tions from 1993 to 2011: the scale of disputes was reduced, and, in contrast to individ-
ual disputes, the frequency of collective disputes also decreased (see Fig. 1). The scale
of collective labor disputes has declined significantly since the early twenty-first cen-
tury. From 1993 to 2003, the average scale of participants in collective disputes was
thirty-four people, whereas between 2004 and 2011, the average was twenty-four
people. 1 In 2008, The Law of Labor Disputes Mediation and Arbitration (hereinafter
Law of Mediation and Arbitration) adjusted the definition of collective disputes from2015 Zhuang. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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Fig. 1 Trend in scale and proportion of Chinese collective labor disputes from 1993 to 2011. Data source:
“Yearbook of Chinese Labor Statistics” (over years)
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scale of collective labor disputes was expected to suddenly surge. However, the statistics
from 2008 did not reflect any significant change, demonstrating the continuation of a
decreasing scale of disputes in spite of the enactment of the Law of Mediation and Ar-
bitration. The proportion of collective disputes accepted by arbitration institutions fell
sharply, decreasing from 7.84 % in 1995 to 3.16 % in 2008 and continuously declining
to 1.19 % in 2011. 2 Even taking the impact of the adjusted statistical rules from 2008
into consideration, this decline was very significant. What factors reduced the fre-
quency and scale of collective labor disputes inside the arbitration channels?
This article argues that since the mid-1980s, the Chinese government has been actively
strengthening its institutional role as a mediator and its substantive power in settling col-
lective labor disputes, and mobilizing all mediatory agencies to continuously take the ini-
tiative to intervene, absorb, and defuse collective labor disputes. Workers’ actions have
gradually been atomized. On the basis of quantitative analysis of provincial-level panel
data from 1999 to 2011, this study finds that mediation by arbitration institutions has sig-
nificantly reduced the scale of collective labor disputes, yet failed to decrease the fre-
quency of their occurrence. This phenomenon is due to selective intervention strategies
that disregard small-scale disputes and focus only on large-scale disputes. This selection
process has led to a statistical decrease of large-scale collective cases, yet an overwhelming
number of small-scale disputes remains. These findings theoretically respond to the ques-
tion of why no massive labor movement occurred during China’s transition period, con-
ceptually highlights the state as a mediator that diverted workers’ protests with flexible
strategies, and empirically addresses the reason why the absolute number of disputes
stayed at a high level and were often mediated but unsolved.
A review of the role of the state in labor disputes in the transition period
In China, no other question is discussed more in the existing literature over the past
20 years than why a massive labor movement did not take place during the transition.
One of the most controversial aspects is the role of the state in resolving labor con-
flicts. In this regard, existing research has mainly been based on four perspectives: the
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formation on the role and action of trade unions (Chan 1993; Chen 2003, 2004, 2009,
2010); the second is legalism, which concerns the influence on labor protection and
rights protection of workers through labor legislation and the regulatory system of labor
(Burell 2001; Ngok 2008; Wang 2006); the third is authoritarianism, which focuses mainly
on local political authorities’ repressive actions against workers’ protests (Cai 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008); and the fourth is the neotraditionalism perspective that concerns the rela-
tionship between management layers and workers in state-owned enterprises in the post-
Mao era (Lee 1999; Walder 1986). These perspectives basically cover the four images of
state-society relation in the China studies mentioned by Wank (1998): the class image,
the traditionalist image, the totalitarian image, and the managerialistic image. These dif-
ferent scenes are intertwined rather than completely separated (Howell 2006). However,
according to the different approaches of research (institution-centered or agency-
centered), and the differences in the definition of labor identity (class identity or citizen-
ship), these studies can be roughly divided into four categories (Fig. 2).
The perspectives of corporatism and neotraditionalism tend to initiate the discussion
of the relationship between the state and labor from the view of class identity. They
therefore focus on labor protests in state-owned enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) and ac-
tions by labor unions. The former emphasizes that labor unions have some agency be-
yond institutional designs, while the latter stresses the path dependency of the
institutional legacy from the planned economy in the reform period. In contrast, legal-
ism and authoritarianism perspectives tend to treat the protests of Chinese workers
during the transition as a rights-defending movement of citizenship rather than collect-
ive actions based on class identity. Specifically, legalism emphasizes the institutional
constraints on state agents (for instance, local authorities, labor bureaucracy, and
courts) and workers’ actions as defined by policies, laws, and the newly developed regu-
latory system, whereas the authoritarianism perspective focuses on how local author-
ities create and deal with workers’ rights protection.
However, studies based on class identity are mainly concerned with the conflicts trig-
gered by the reform of SOEs in the initial stage of reform. The neotraditionalist perspec-
tive is reluctant to explain why the fight by workers in non-state-owned enterprises since
the mid- to late 1990s was controlled, and the corporatism perspective fails to explain the
absence of labor movement in foreign and private enterprises in which labor unions are
weak. Moreover, the analytical perspective based on class identity may have some limita-
tions in regard to the legally mobilized actions by workers through institutional channelsFig. 2 Four perspective on the role of the Chinese state in labor conflicts
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increasing labor population during the transformation period is the rural migrants. The
three most common incentives for them to protest were wage disputes, severe disciplines
and violation of personal dignity on the factory floor, and compensation for work acci-
dents; their identity in their struggle was mainly based on citizenship and being a vulner-
able group, and their actions were protests against discrimination. For SOE workers, their
identity in protests was primarily based on the concepts of class, citizenship, and being a
vulnerable group. However, being a member of the proletariat was an identity for protest
or political discourse that workers might cite during social protests, rather than a product,
as claimed by Marx, generated during the process when workers were integrated into the
capitalistic mode of production; it was actually a protest of desperation (Lee 2007, 12).
Chan (2012) argues that the labor protests triggered by the privatization of state-owned
enterprises were essentially a fight of civil rights based on social rights rather than a fight
for better working conditions that emerged from a class struggle based on particular
class interests. This was particularly true for laid-off workers from state-owned com-
panies, who had quit a productive relationship and therefore could not form real class
consciousness. In contrast, the collective strikes and bargaining in the coastal areas
against foreign and private enterprises in recent years appeared to be more like class
struggles against employers.
The state has adopted very different approaches in response to different types of
labor disputes. Chen and Tang (2013, 566) believe that there were three types of labor
conflicts emerged during China’s transformation: in the early stage, the protests of
workers from state-owned enterprises were based on a moral economy, mainly in pur-
suit of wage and social security that would maintain their living standard. These pro-
tests were in accordance with the socialist discourse and survival ethics before the
reform, and mainly took the form of leapfrog petitions and sit-down protests. The au-
thorities responded mainly by introducing special relief programs and discouraging
protests. Later, more rights protection action in the non-state-owned sector was carried
out in light of the concept of rights, in pursuit of legally secured wages (and wages for
overtime work) and compensation for work-related injuries. Such action relied on spe-
cific laws and policies, and usually took the form of arbitration and litigation. The au-
thorities responded mainly through (quasi-)judicial disposition and providing legal
services. However, in recent years, more and more protests concerned conflicts of in-
terests. They aimed at increasing wages and improving working conditions, were based
on a sense of economic fairness, and mainly took the form of strikes. The responsive
strategies of authorities changed to communicating and negotiating with protesters and
employing force to break up the protesters (Chen and Tang 2013, 566).
Since this paper mainly discusses legal rights protection of workers based on civil
rights rather than the strikes of industrial workers and collective negotiations, its per-
spective consequently focuses on the relationship between the state and workers based
on citizenship. In this regard, the existing legalism perspective mainly emphasizes the
path dependence of institutions and their subsequent constraints on workers. For ex-
ample, Chen (2007) believes that the Chinese state actively met the rights of individual
workers (contracts, wages, working conditions, benefits, and so on) through labor legis-
lation, but did not grant workers collective rights (rights to forming organizations,
strikes, collective bargaining, and so on). Lack of collective rights always led to the
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tradition of Leninism and the current national development strategies (Chen 2007).
Similarly, Gallagher (2006) also stresses the impact of legal individualism on the
individualization of collective actions and labor disputes by Chinese workers. However,
these studies overestimated the impact of the static legal system on workers. Neither
did they explain why, given the universal national labor policies, a huge difference
existed in the collective actions of workers in different places.
Another actor-centered perspective stresses the toughness of the authoritarian state in
repressing workers’ protests. As defined by Tilly, repression is “any action by the other
party of protest that increases the cost of collective actions by protesters” (Tilly 1978,
100). Cai (2008) states that the central government sometimes acquiesced to the suppres-
sion of protesters by local governments since it could avoid the spread of protests and the
appearance of social organizations. However, in order to avoid continued repression that
might tempt the masses to seek alternative political systems, the central government occa-
sionally intervened and punished local officials who provoked incidents of rights protec-
tion so as to preserve the legitimacy of governmental rights. Moreover, the repression of
labor struggles carried out by the state included rigid crackdowns such as the use of the
armed forces. Oberschall (1973) conceptually distinguishes two types of repression: rigid
and coercive measures, and pliable channeling strategies. Coercive measures were gener-
ally the direct use of police, army, and other armed forces, while channeling took the form
of various indirect restrictions on the methods, time, and resources of protest. Earl (2003,
2006) deems that the latter also played an important role. The above perspective of au-
thoritarianism only observes coercive repression and ignores the effect of channeling on
the control of labor struggles. Based on the latter, this paper treats the mediation mechan-
ism as a strategy of channeling repression, and explores the effect of this strategy on the
handling of labor disputes.Mediation as a channeling strategy to resolve collective labor disputes
Since 1987 when the formal system for handling labor disputes was rebuilt, a variety of
mediation mechanisms has been used by authorities to resolve collective labor disputes.
This flexible strategy of governance took slightly different forms in different stages of
implementation, but its logic of adjustment of the regime has been consistent—it aims
at maximizing the absorption and resolution of collective labor disputes, thereby pre-
venting the uniting of collective interests, awareness, and actions of workers. The medi-
ation mechanism for labor disputes in China between 1987 and 2012 can be divided
into three general phases: from 1987 to 1992, an internal mediation model featuring
mediation committees inside enterprises; from 1993 to 2007, an arbitral mediation
model featuring institutes of labor arbitration; and from 2008 to 2012, a grand medi-
ation model featuring the use of a variety of mediation power and resources integrally
and strategically.(1) 1987–1992: Mediation inside enterprises
After the completion of the socialist transformation in 1956, labor disputes were
regarded as contradictions among the people and always disposed of by the petition
channel. In January 1985 when the state council issued the Announcement on the Issue
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that linked payment to individual performance, the old system was already unable to
accommodate the surge of grievances and dissatisfaction among the workers. Accord-
ing to incomplete statistics, in 1988, the number of stoppages and strikes due to labor
disputes was three times more than that of 1987 and eight times more than that of
1986. In Liaoning Province, between January and July alone, 276 incidents of business
leaders being violently threatened or beaten took place, resulting in three deaths, 31
serious injuries, and 120 minor injuries (Yearbook of Chinese Labor Department 1990,
324–27). The fierce conflicts triggered by the wage reform caused the central govern-
ment to attach great importance to the reconstruction of the system for resolving labor
disputes. On April 18, 1986, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) and the State Council enacted the Announcement of Seriously Implementing
Several Provisions on Labor System Reform, and particularly pointed out that “the re-
form of the labor system is related to the vital interests of the masses, involving mul-
tiple aspects, requiring strong policies as backup, and is difficult to be implemented…in
the process of implementing these provisions. We should pay great attention to letters
and petitions from people and the disposal issues of labor disputes” (Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of China, and State Council 1986). On July 12 of the same
year, the State Council published the Notice of Issuing Four Provisions to Reform the
Labor System, mentioning for the first time the reconstruction of arbitral institutes for
labor disputes. On July 31, 1987, the State Council issued the Interim Provisions for
the Disposal of Labor Disputes in State-owned Enterprises (hereinafter interim provi-
sions), marking the resumption of an arbitral and litigation system that had been sus-
pended for three decades. The main goal of rebuilding this system was to control the
collective struggles of workers resulted from the reform of state-owned enterprises. In
accordance with the interim provisions, the disposal system for labor disputes formed a
mode of “one mediation, one arbitration, and two lawsuits.” Labor disputes in state-
owned enterprises would first be mediated by mediation committees inside the enter-
prises. If this failed, workers could apply for labor arbitration before they refused to
accept arbitral results and sued in the people’s courts.
In fact, before 1993, the vast majority of labor disputes were resolved within enter-
prises and did not progress to formal procedures (see Table 1). In this period, the state
quickly established a large number of mediation committees inside the state-owned
and collective enterprises based on the existing networks of trade unions inside them.
According to the statistics of 22 provinces and autonomous regions, there were 57,786
mediation committees by the end of 1989 (Yearbook of Chinese Labor Department
1990, 324–27). By 1992, state-owned enterprises in all regions had as many as 108,460
mediation committees, which approached a coverage rate of 60 % (Office of PolicyTable 1 Mediation results by enterprise mediation committees, 1991 and 1992
Year 1991 1992
Cases accepted by enterprise mediation committees 94,398 84,286
Cases successfully mediated by enterprise mediation committees 63,539 58,576
Mediation rate by enterprise mediation committees 67.31 % 69.50 %
Cases formally accepted by labor arbitration institutions 7633 8150
Data sources: Yearbook of Chinese Labor Unions Statistics, Yearbook of Chinese Labor Statistics, Chinese Yearbook of
Labor (over years)
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zations were able to resolve a large number of labor disputes because many controver-
sies lacked the legal basis for arbitration or litigation (Pereenbom 2009). Therefore,
many labor disputes, even if sent to arbitral institutes, could basically be settled
through multiple mediations (see Table 2).
By the end of 1992, of the approximately 1 million cases of labor disputes handled by
various types of settlement institutes around the country, more than 70 % were settled
by mediation committees in enterprises, while 25 % were mediated outside arbitral in-
stitutes before being filed. Only about 50,000 dispute cases were formally accepted by
arbitral institutes; of these, only about 10 % were arbitrated, while the other 90 % were
settled either by mediation or withdrawal by prosecutors after mediation. 3 There are
three reasons that mediation became the main way to resolve disputes. First, since na-
tional legislation in the field of labor had not been well developed in this period, arbi-
trators lacked criteria and legal basis when handling these cases; they could only handle
cases through mediation (Yearbook of Chinese Labor Department 1990, 324–27). Sec-
ond, labor arbitral institutes across the country were at the initial stage of reconstruc-
tion; their personnel were inadequately trained and often relied on local mediation to
defuse escalating cases (Yearbook of Chinese Labor Department 1990, 211–14). Finally,
in addition to the inability of the legal system and weak administrative capacity, medi-
ation was also the state’s principal strategy to maximally control social conflicts result-
ing from intensive transformation. The reform of state-own enterprises brought about
collective rather than individual conflicts, which often evolved into slowdowns, stop-
pages, strikes, and violence (Cai 2006; Chen 2000). Through mediation, the state could
fully intervene into collective conflicts, handle them through institutionalized channels,
disperse the solidarity of workers, and minimize the social conflicts triggered by institu-
tional changes.(2) 1993–2007: Mediation by labor arbitration institutions
By the early 1990s, workplace mediation, as the first line of defense, began to fail, for
three main reasons: first, enterprise mediation committees mainly relied on trade
unions to function. Thus, only in medium or large enterprises in which the congressesTable 2 Settlement by labor dispute arbitration institutions, 1987 to 1992
Year 1986.10–1987.8 1988–1989 1990 1991 1992
Extra-arbitral mediation NA 5546 NA NA 15,000
Formally accepted 2679 19,453 9619 7633 8150
Settled 2079 21,473 9395 7521 7861
Including: mediated during arbitration 1930 12,946 5720 4682 4712
Arbitrated 125 1789 932 1027 1178
Settled by other measures 24 6738 2743 1812 1971
Arbitration rate 6.01 % 8.33 % 9.92 % 13.66 % 14.99 %
Mediation rate 92.83 % 60.29 % 60.88 % 62.25 % 59.94 %
Appeal to court after arbitral procedure 10 441 218 235 223
Appeal rate 8.00 24.65 23.39 22.88 18.93
Data sources: Chinese Yearbook of Labor (over years) and Chinese Labour Net (http://www.labournet.com.cn)
The item of “settled by other measures” refers mainly to reconciled and withdrawn cases
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committees play a truly effective role. However, neither trade unions nor mediation
committees inside collective enterprises, private enterprises, and foreign-funded enter-
prises were well established. Second, trade unions in enterprises were not economically
independent from the managerial layers of corporations. It was difficult for unions to
adopt impartial dispositions. Consequently, workers often refused to accept the medi-
ation offered by mediation committees or trade unions within enterprises. Third, prior
to the 1990s, the vast majority of labor disputes were triggered by the reform of state-
owned enterprises, while after the 1990s, more and more labor disputes occurred out-
side state-owned enterprises (Gallagher 2006). Especially in foreign-funded and private
enterprises, labor conflicts were intensified, often leading to collective stoppages, slow-
downs, and strikes (Chinese Labor Net 2009). In April 1993, eight cases of consecutive
strikes, work stoppages, and petitions occurred in Fujian Province. In May, the leaders
of the central government learned about this from the Bulletin of the Ministry of Public
Safety and immediately sent instructions and urged the relevant departments to study
countermeasures. In June, the central government held a national symposium on the
issue of collective negotiations and strikes. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor urgently
issued the Notice of the Prevention and Treatment of Collective Petitions and Strikes
by Workers, which urged local departments of labor to educate workers in a timely
manner, to intervene in, channel, and quell workers’ protests, and report statistical in-
formation on collective petitions and strikes. In July, the State Council promulgated the
“Regulation on Handling Labor Disputes in Enterprises” (hereinafter Regularization on
Disputes). It broadened the scope of application from inside state-owned enterprises
only to labor disputes in all types of enterprises. Moreover, the Regularization on Dis-
putes was also applicable to disputes between workers and state organs, institutions,
and social organizations, as well as between individual businesses and workers or
apprentices.
In addition, the new regulation also explicitly set “focusing on mediation and timely
treatment” as the first principle of the resolution of labor disputes. Shortly after the intro-
duction of the Regularization on Disputes, the leaders of the Ministry of Labor stressed
that workers in collective labor disputes should apply for mediation. If they turned directly
to strikes or lockouts without applying for mediation, they would be penalized according
to security regulations. Moreover, during the application of mediation and the process of
conciliation, workers could not turn to strikes or other acts (Yearbook of Chinese Labor
Department 1995, 158–62). Under these circumstances, labor arbitration became the core
of the new system. In order to avoid the occurrence of large-scale collective actions by
workers, the Ministry of Labor required local institutions of labor arbitration to promptly
resolve disputes and avoid protracted cases that could lead to trouble, especially in dealing
with sudden cases triggered by collective disputes. The fastest way to close cases was to
make mediation a priority. At the time, the Ministry of Labor explicitly assigned tasks, ur-
ging the proportion of mediation and withdrawal to increase from 82 % to more than
90 % at the end of 1995, and the clearance rate rose from 73 % to at least 85 % (Yearbook
of Chinese Labor Department 1995, 151–57).
Pushed by the governments, the proportion of mediated cases among all cases admit-
ted by labor arbitral institutes remained stubbornly high during this period (see Fig. 3).
Prior to 1996, the proportion of arbitral or extra-arbitral mediated cases exceeded
Fig. 3 Settlements by Chinese labor arbitration institutions, 1993 to 2007. Data source: Yearbook of Chinese
Labor Statistics (over years)
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cases that were directly ruled by the labor departments and closed was less than 30 %.
At the same time, in order to strengthen the capacity of labor arbitral institutes to
intervene into frequently occurring labor disputes, the Ministry of Labor issued the
Outlined Tutorial of Handling Labor Disputes (January 3, 1995), the Appointment and
Management Guidelines of Labor Arbitrators (March 22, 1995), the Notice of Further
Improving the Framework of Tripartism in Labor Disputes (March 18, 1996), the No-
tice of Determined Pilot Areas for Improving the Settlement System of Labor Disputes
(July 25, 1996), and a series of other documents. A nationwide training program for
labor arbitrators and mediators was also launched (Yearbook of Chinese Labor Depart-
ment 1998, 190). The construction of a top-down promoted organization expanded the
coverage of labor arbitration institutions and enriched the resources of institutions.
The situation in which the authorities were trapped in bureaucratically filed arbitra-
tions, a situation that was originally due to the lack of resources, was greatly eased.
Meanwhile, the standardization of the arbitration proceedings also helped absorb the
disputes that did not originally meet the conditions of admission. In 1997, the propor-
tion of cases extra-arbitrarily mediated was greatly reduced, while the proportion of ar-
bitrated cases increased significantly. However, after 2000, the proportion of cases
mediated and conciliated outside or inside began to gradually rebound before stabiliz-
ing. It is worth noting that from 1993 to 2007, most annual proportions of arbitration
were under 50 %, except for 2001 when it reached the peak of 51 %.(C) 2008–2012: Grand mediation and classified mediation
Mediation by labor department soon encountered a bottleneck. At the end of 1995,
China had 11,292 part-time and full-time arbitrators of labor disputes (Yearbook of
Chinese Labor Department 1997, 135); in 2006, the number of full-time arbitrators was
about 9800, with 14,000 part-time (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2008). In
stark contrast to the slow expansion of the number of arbitrators, the number of labor
disputes reaching arbitral institutions increased by nearly 15 times (including cases
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502,084. 4 Heavy workloads prolonged the already-cumbersome and complex arbitra-
tion proceedings. In provinces with severe labor conflicts such as Guangdong, complet-
ing a labor dispute case through the process of “one mediation, one arbitration, and
two lawsuits” required nearly 1 year even without any extension, and could expand to
more than 30 months if any extension occurred. The limited capacity of arbitral insti-
tutes drove a large number of workers to take the extreme action of protesting outside
arbitral tribunals during the long arbitral processes. Leapfrog petitions, highway con-
tainment, looting companies’ property, and destruction of equipment emerged as con-
stant actions (Li 2008). Especially in 2005, when the number of large-scaled collective
incidents triggered by labor problems increased significantly, the leadership of the Min-
istry of Labour began to realize that labor disputes had evolved from an issue with im-
pacts on the economic order into a major issue that challenged the social order and
triggered social instability (Yearbook of Chinese Labor Department 2007, 90–97).
In this regard, on October 11, 2006, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC
Central Committee (CPCCC) passed the Decisions on Several Major Issues about
Building a Socialist Harmonious Society, clearly indicating its intent to “build a
government-led mechanism to safeguard people’s rights and interests, achieve an or-
ganic combination of people’s mediation, administrative mediation and judicial medi-
ation, comprehensively use strategies of law, policy, finance, administration, etc. and
other means of education, consultation, counseling, etc. to resolve the grassroots-level
contradictions and at the initial stage”. This directive not only claimed to strengthen
the role of the Communist Party in the mechanism of rights protection, but also mobi-
lized more administrative organizations and resources for the mediation of social con-
flicts. The leadership of labor departments interpreted the decision by the central
government as a new governing approach, which was “prevent first, grassroots first,
and mediate first” (see Tian 2008). This was soon integrated into a new round of labor
legislation movements in 2007. In 2007, while introducing the Labor Contract Law and
other legal entities, the central government also released a renewed Law of Mediation
and Arbitration on December 29, 2007, and enacted it on May 1, 2008. The biggest
change in this revised version was that it enhanced the government’s role as a mediator
in the labor disputes. The original framework of “one mediation, one arbitration, and
two lawsuits” was changed to “three mediations, one arbitration, and two lawsuits.” In
addition to the mediation committees for labor disputes in businesses, 5 mediation or-
ganizations among grassroots and organizations that mediated disputes in towns and
street offices were also allowed to mediate labor disputes. The purpose of this was to
directly involve governmental power into grassroots-level labor disputes. 6
It is noteworthy that during this period, the state more strategically mediated labor
disputes. On October 30, 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
and other departments jointly issued the Opinion on Strengthening the Mediation of
Labor Disputes, which preliminarily outlined the strategy of classified mediation. Ac-
cording to this opinion, mediation committees would mainly target large- and
medium-sized enterprises with relatively well-developed unions; the focus of labor and
social security service centers (stations) of towns and streets would lie mainly on medi-
ating disputes from individuals and private enterprises; in dispute-prone areas and vil-
lages and communities with many businesses, justice centers and people’s mediation
Zhuang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2015) 2:7 Page 11 of 25committees that were originally designed to resolve disputes in the community would
also strengthen their mediation function for labor disputes. In accordance with this
strategy, the central labor department proposed the goal that about 50 % of simple and
small cases would be settled by mediation within enterprises, towns, and street offices
in 3 to 5 years (Yearbook of Chinese Human Resources and Social Security Department
2010, 769). Since many new mediators were beyond the scope of the labor administra-
tion system, in April 2010, the office of the central committee of comprehensive
management of social security issued the Opinion on Effective Performance of Com-
prehensive Investigation and Mediation of Disputes, which proposed the implementa-
tion of “grand mediation” across the country, resolving social conflicts through
integrating power and resources from all institutes related to mediation (Central
Committee of Comprehensive Management of Social Security, 2010). In April 2011, this
proposal gained support from the other 15 ministries of the central government. They
jointly issued the Guidance on Further Promoting the Mediation of Conflicts and
Disputes. In August of the same year, in the National Conference on Labor Relationships
the leaders of the central government again mobilized all ministries to integrate resources
and strengthen cooperation to prevent and deal with significant labor disputes and
incidents of the masses (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 2012a).
Statistically speaking, the central government’s prevent first, grassroots first, and me-
diate first approach was well executed. In 2010, various types of labor dispute agencies
accepted 1,287,400 cases, of which 6 % were handled by mediation committees within
enterprises; 6 % by community, neighborhood, and villager committees; 17 % by town
and street offices; and more than 5 % by district-level and county-level mediation agen-
cies. Altogether, these agencies mediated more than 34 % of total disputes (China Labor
Net 2011). By 2011, among the 1,315,000 labor disputes admitted by various types of
dispute mediation agencies across the country, mediation organizations had taken 50 %
(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 2012b). In 2012, mediation
accounted for more than 63.06 % of the resolution of 1,332,000 disputes (Chinese
Labor Net 2013).
In summary, the variation of the mediator’s role and function at different stages from
1987 to 2012, the basic goal that the mediation mechanism was to be used to absorb
and diffuse collective labor disputes, remained unchanged (see Table 3). The state con-
tinued to consolidate its institutional role as a mediator through legislation and also
through a variety of top-down political mobilization policies to strengthen its substan-
tive mediatory capacity. Unions, the labor bureaucracy, courts, towns, street offices,
and other agencies were mobilized to guard against frequent collective protests by
workers. Through active and proactive intervention and persistent mediation, the state
prevented workers’ collective struggles from presenting a challenge to the economic,
social, and even political order.
Hypotheses and operationalization
Data from 1992 to 2011 demonstrate that the labor disputes arbitrated by arbitral insti-
tutes were only the tip of the iceberg compared to all admitted cases. The principle of
“mediate first” was prioritized by arbitral institutes of labor disputes in the process of
filing and hearing cases in order to prevent collective actions by workers. As a conse-
quence, the majority of the cases were mediated inside or outside the arbitral institutes
Table 3 Transformation of the labor dispute mediation system from 1987 to 2012
Period 1987–1992 1993–2007 2008–2012
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Zhuang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2015) 2:7 Page 12 of 25before being submitted to an arbitral decision (see Fig. 4). As mentioned above, this
pre-mediation mechanism may have reduced the scale and frequency of collective labor
disputes admitted by arbitral institutes. 7 In order to test these causal-effect relation-
ships, this work constructs the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis one: Mediation has reduced the scale of labor disputes admitted by arbi-
tral institutions.
Hypothesis two: Mediation has reduced the frequency of labor disputes admitted by
arbitral institutions.
First of all, in the aspect of operationalization, the selection of dependent variables
needs to be explained. The scale of labor disputes is calculated as the ratio of total
number of workers involved in labor disputes to the number of collective disputes ad-
mitted by arbitral institutes of labor disputes across the country. The frequency of
disputes can be measured as the proportion of admitted collective disputes in total
labor disputes. In regard to the explanatory variable, the overall performance of medi-
ation is measured by adding up the cases mediated before and after they were admit-
ted by arbitral institutes (see Eq. 1).Fig. 4 Tendency of settlement by labor arbitration institutions, 1992 to 2011. Data source: Yearbook of
Chinese Labor Statistics (over years)
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¼ cases settled byarbitral and extraarbitralmediation
cases settled byextraarbitralmediationþ admitted casesþ unfinished cases fromlast period
ð1Þ
For control variables, exit behaviors of workers and the responses by governmentsdeserve most consideration. Their decrease in admitted number of cases by arbitral in-
stitutes may be due to the decrease in willingness to apply for arbitral remedies but in-
stead turn to street protests that could prompt an increased effort of mediation by
local governments. This can be converted to a problem of an omitted variable, which
can be overcome by controlling the proportion of complaints about the labor arbitra-
tion system (number of cases in which workers applied for labor arbitration divided by
the number of the employed urban population; the unit is incidents per 10,000). An-
other possible omitted variable is the type of dispute. Actions for rights protection re-
lated to wages and payment for overtime work often trigger large-scale collective labor
movements, whereas issues such as social insurance and welfare benefits often cause
small-scale disputes. The nature of disputes also influences the level of difficulty for
mediators in dealing with them. This article thus controls the different types of labor
disputes by calculating the ratio of the number of labor disputes on social welfare to
the number of labor disputes on payment.
The second control is the heavy-handed repression by local governments. Supervised by
local committees for politics and law, the local departments of public safety, procurato-
rates, and courts were mobilized to control various forms of instability, including workers’
rights protection that could lead to collective incidents. The abundance of resources that
these local committees can mobilize determined the scale and frequency of workers’ col-
lective struggle, and could also become a bargaining chip between local governments and
the two sides of employers and employees. This article measures the index of arbitrary re-
sources that could be mobilized by local governments in terms of the expenditures of
local political and legal systems averaged by the number of regular local residents (unit:
yuan per person) to control the impact of repression by local governments.
In addition, the impact of grassroots-level trade unions and mediation committees of
enterprises is also an important factor to be controlled. From the early 1980s, in order
to avoid massive labor struggles triggered by the reform of the labor system, the state
began to actively promote preemptive actions by trade unions and actively intervene
into labor disputes. This strategy of corporatism effectively prevented the cohesion of
interests of the working class (Chan 1993). Grassroots-level trade unions directly inter-
vened into mediation by developing mediation committees based on their established
networks. To some extent, the regular operation of mediation committees also played a
preventive role in the collective actions of workers. This article thus measures the
coverage of mediation committees by the number of mediation committees inside en-
terprises averaged by employed urban population (unit: number per 10,000 people).8
Finally, this work controls local economic conditions in the model—indices of local eco-
nomic development and foreign economic dependence—that are respectively measured
as per capita GDP (unit: yuan/person) and the ratio of direct foreign investment to GDP.
In addition, the paper also controls the size of the urban labor population (number of
urban employees; unit: 10,000), marketization of labor (proportion of employees from
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employees in secondary and tertiary industries, structural factors of the labor market such
as the unemployment rate. Also, in order to rule out the influence of certain social and
demographic structural factors, this work also indirectly controls the scale of migrants by
calculating the ratio of the regular population to the household-registered population.
All data used in this article was drawn from the Yearbook of Chinese Labor Statistics
and other official publications, spanning from 1999 to 2011. 9 It covers 31 provinces, mu-
nicipalities, and autonomous regions. Table 4 lists the basic analysis for all those above
variables. Per capita GDP and per capita political and legal expenditure were adjusted to
real currency based on the price index of 2000. In the model, all variables with skewed
distributions were converted through natural logarithm to approximate normality.
Methods
In order to control the fixed effect of provinces and years, 10 this work adopts the
method of least squares with dummy variable (LSDV). Provinces and years are con-
verted to a series of dummy variables in the model. Meanwhile, to avoid spurious re-
gression caused by the time variable, this article includes time trend in the model as
well. The regression model is expressed by the following formula:
yit ¼ αþ βxit þ θkZit þ μi þ γt þ εit; i ¼ 1; 2…31; t ¼ 1999; 2000;…; 2011
In the equation above, yit is the dependent variable; xit is the explanatory variable; Zit
is a series of control variables; μi is the province-level fixed effects; γt is the fixed effect
of time; and εit is other factors that might be effective but are not identified by in mode,
which is assumed to be random. The subscript i represents 31 provinces, municipal-
ities, and autonomous regions; t represents the 13 years from 1999 to 2011; and k is
the number of control variables. To overcome the effects of heteroscedasticity, this
work uses Huber-White robust standard errors.Table 4 List of variables
Variables Obs Mean Std Min Max
Average involved workers per collective dispute case
accepted by arbitration institution (Ln)
371 3.15 0.75 0.56 5.62
Proportion of collective dispute cases accepted by
arbitration institution (Ln)
371 −3.24 0.97 −6.35 -0.25
Mediatory capacity of labor arbitration institutions 302 0.49 0.14 0.15 0.88
Appeal rate of labor arbitration by workers (Ln) 366 2.26 1.34 −2.81 6.14
Ratio of social-security disputes to payment disputes (Ln) 355 0.02 0.91 −4.80 2.18
Expenditure on political and legal affairs per capita (Ln) 355 4.99 0.74 2.83 7.19
Coverage of enterprise mediation committees 371 13.85 11.26 0.18 6.04
GDP per capita (Ln) 372 9.52 0.67 7.88 11.10
FDI dependency 372 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.10
Scale of urban labor 372 61.33 426.16 22.56 2601.89
Marketization of labor 372 0.54 0.15 0.21 0.86
Ratio of employees in secondary industries to those in
tertiary industries
371 0.70 0.26 0.26 1.47
Unemployment rate 371 3.71 0.70 0.80 6.50
Ratio of resident population to registered population 372 1.03 0.12 0.82 1.65
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As the analysis show (Table 5), the mediation by labor arbitration institutions has re-
duced the scale of collective labor disputes that they have admitted. In model 1, the re-
gression coefficient of the mediation capacity of labor arbitral institutes toward average
scale of admitted labor disputes (natural logarithm) is −0.923 at the 0.05 significance
level. This means that arbitral institutes’ long-standing strategy of mediate first played a
role in channeling workers’ conflicts regarding rights protection. It effectively reduced
the scale of collective labor disputes that they admitted. A variety of mediation mecha-
nisms before arbitration functioned well to differentiate the cohesion of workers, grad-
ually causing workers in institutionalized relief channels to act individually.
On the other hand, mediation did not reduce the frequency of occurrence of collect-
ive disputes. In model 2, the mediation capacity of arbitral institutes does not pass the
significance test, which might be caused by arbitral institutes’ selective intervention.
Under pressure to maintain social stability, governments mainly focus on the incidents
of the masses related to large-scale collective labor disputes rather than cases of rela-
tively small scale or by individuals that were not mediated with priority. As stipulated
in the Law of Mediation and Arbitration, cases of more than ten people are considered
collective disputes. However, for arbitral institutes, collective cases involving 11 people
are not very different from individual cases involving nine people. Under the circum-
stances of a high workload but limited number of arbitrators, only cases of rights pro-
tection involving large numbers of workers were likely to be a priority for resolution. In
this regard, governments often used the strategy of “divide and rule” by which large-
scale collective cases were split into a series of small-scale cases. They were then medi-
ated separately in order to disunite workers and defuse potential collective actions
(Chen and Xu 2012, 101–102). Therefore, strengthening the mediatory capacity of arbi-
tration institutions resulted in the decrease of massive collective labor disputes, but not
the direct decrease of small-scale collective labor disputes. Statistically speaking, arbi-
tral mediation may not directly reduce the proportion of collective cases among all
labor disputes.11(B) Robustness test
The preliminary results above need further testing of robustness in regard to the con-
struction of measured terms and causal inference. For the measured items, since the au-
thor constructed both the dependent and explanatory variables, measurement errors may
exist in them. In this regard, this article validates the constructed items by replacing the
measured terms. The original explanatory variable is obtained by adding up the cases of
mediation inside and outside labor arbitral channels, whereas the replacement item of
mediation capacity is achieved by dividing cases into extra-arbitral mediation and arbitral
mediation, which are respectively calculated by the proportions of cases successfully me-
diated prior to the filing of cases and in arbitral court. The two dependent variables—scale
and frequency of collective disputes—are also replaced by two new indicators: the propor-
tion of employees involved in collective disputes admitted by labor arbitral institutes in
the total urban workforce (unit: persons per 10,000 people), and the ratio of collective
labor disputes admitted by labor arbitral institutes to the number of total urban workforce
(unit: incidents per 10,000 people). Table 6 shows the results with these alternative items.
Table 5 Province-level panel analysis of the determinants of collective labor disputes, 1999 to 2011
Models (1) (2)
Dependent variables Average involved workers per collective
dispute case accepted by arbitration
institutions (Ln)
Proportion of collective dispute
cases accepted by arbitration
institutions (Ln)
Explanatory variables













Expenditures on political and







GDP per capita (Ln) 0.043 −1.065
(0.461) (0.553)
FDI dependency −3.232 11.099**
(4.150) (4.082)
Scale of urban labor 0.001** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Marketization of labor −0.112 −0.178
(1.087) (1.105)
Ratio of employees in




Unemployment rate 0.349** −0.035
(0.114) (0.136)






Province-fixed effects Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes
Province-specific time trend Yes Yes
Observations 280 280
R-squared 0.500 0.722
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses
*,**,***Denote significance at the 95, 99, and 99.9 % levels, respectively
Zhuang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2015) 2:7 Page 16 of 25
Table 6 List of alternative measurements
Variables Obs Mean Std Min Max
Extra-arbitral mediatory capacity of labor arbitration institutions 325 0.24 0.16 0.00 0.80
Arbitral mediatory capacity of labor arbitration institutions 325 0.26 0.10 0.05 0.76
Ratio of involved workers in collective labor disputes to urban labor (Ln) 402 2.38 1.03 −2.09 6.12
Ratio of collective labor disputes to urban labor (Ln) 402 −0.79 0.95 −3.93 3.35
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ent with earlier preliminary results. In model 3, arbitral and extra-arbitral mediation re-
duced the average numbers of workers involved in admitted collective disputes (natural
logarithm) at 5 % significance level, while in model 4, the coefficient of alternative ex-
planatory variables toward the proportion of collective disputes is still not significant.
With alternative dependent variables, the regression coefficient of the mediation cap-
acity of arbitral institutes toward the proportion of employees involved in collective
labor disputes in the urban labor force (natural logarithm) is −1.089 at 0.01 significance
level, and not able to pass a significant test toward the ratio of admitted collective dis-
putes to the urban labor force (natural logarithm) (Table 7).
Even taking the correction of measurement error into account, causal inference is still
unreliable based on the preliminary results above. Although hypothesis one passes the
test with the above analysis, it suffers from the endogeneous problem. That is to say,
the reduced-scale of collective disputes may have decreased the difficulty of mediation,
which consequently enhanced the proportion of successful mediation. Thus, the statis-
tically negative correlation may also be the result of a reverse causality. To test the ro-
bustness of causality, this article takes two measures. First, it substitutes values of
explanatory variables with one lag, using time lag to overcome the problem of recipro-
cal causation. The other measure uses the system-generalized method of moments
(System-GMM), using the second lag of explanatory variables as an instrument to ad-
just the models (discussion of this method can be obtained from Blundell and Bond
1998; Roodman 2009).
Table 8 shows the results of LSDV estimation with one-lagged explanatory variables,
and one-step robust and two-step robust System-GMM, respectively. In model 7, the
coefficient reduces to −0.777 using an explanatory variable with one lag and does not
pass the significance test. This change is likely due to the demonstrative effect: if the ar-
bitral institutions spare no effort to mediate collective disputes and show a strong cap-
acity to deal with those disputes, it could encourage more workers to file collective
appeals. Since a time lag existed between the dissemination of information on the suc-
cessful resolution of labor disputes and the announcement of filing a collective dispute,
the demonstration effect would be greater in later time periods. When the models use
one-lagged explanatory variables, there is thus an offset between the positive demon-
stration effect and negative differentiation effect, causing an insignificant decline in the
regression coefficient. 12 In contrast, the results estimated by the system-GMM are
consistent with the preliminary findings in the foregoing analysis. In model 9 and
model 11, the regression coefficients of the mediation capacity of arbitral institutes to-
ward the scale of collective disputes are −1.298 and −3.636 and significant at the 5 %
level. 13 The test result of AR(2) shows that the differences in the residuals of these two
models do not exhibit second-order serial correlation. 14 The result of the Sargan test
Table 7 Robustness test of measured items










































Constants 154.109 27.324 5.221 −104.318
(153.751) (208.907) (208.262) (213.600)
Previous control
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific
time trend
Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.503 0.723 0.692 0.662
Observations 280 280 280 280
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses
*,**,***Denote significance at the 95, 99, and 99.9 % levels, respectively
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the corresponding model, the relationship between the mediation capacity of labor ar-
bitral institutes and the frequency of collective incidents still does not pass the signifi-
cance test. In model 8, model 10, and model 12, both one-lagged and current
explanatory variables do not pass the significance test. In model 10 and model 12, the
Sargan test shows that there may be endogenous instrumental variables. After pushing
the lag time for three lags, the endogeneity disappears, yet the mediation capacity of ar-
bitral institutes still does not pass the significance test.
Conclusions
Since the re-establishment of the disposal system of labor disputes in 1986, the Chinese
state’s capacity to absorb collective struggles of workers has been growing. While the ab-
solute number of collective labor disputes admitted by arbitral institutes increased, the
scale and frequency of large-scale collective labor disputes declined. This paper argues
Table 8 Robustness test of the causality between mediatory capacity of labor arbitration institutions and handled collective labor disputes
Models (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Methods LSDV LSDV System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM
One-step One-step Two-step Two-step
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Province-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-specific time
trend
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes











Table 8 Robustness test of the causality between mediatory capacity of labor arbitration institutions and handled collective labor disputes (Continued)
AR(2) 1.24 p = .213 −0.93 p = .351 0.17 p = .866 −0.62 p = .536
Sargan test Chi2 = 78.13 p = .110 Chi2 = 59.01 p = .043 Chi2 = 36.34 p = .636 Chi2 = 53.80 p = .028
Observations 272 272 279 279 279 279
R-squared 0.430 0.723
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses
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strengthening capacity to mediate collective labor disputes. In addition to gradually expand-
ing institutionalized channels, a growing number of resources and organizations have been
mobilized to mediate collective labor disputes. In the grand mediation era, the mediation
strategies of the state are becoming increasingly sophisticated and are starting to classify
labor disputes with different kinds of appeals and different kinds of ownership before medi-
ation. These continuously improving and expanding mediation mechanisms produced sig-
nificant effects of prevention and factorization on workers’ labor disputes during China’s
transition. Through statistical testing of provincial-level panel data from 1999–2011, this
article finds that mediation by labor arbitral institutes has significantly reduced the average
scale of admitted labor disputes but failed to lower the occurrence of collective disputes. On
one hand, this shows that the strategy of mediate first effectively channeled collective ac-
tions and broke up the solidarity of workers. On the other hand, it reveals the fact that arbi-
tral mediation is highly selective. This is reflected in the strategy of “focusing on large-scale
ones but ignoring small-scale ones” taken by arbitral institutes. They concentrate on the
prevention of and intervention in large-scale collective disputes, and neglect those of small
scale or by individuals. As a result, arbitral mediation only reduced the number of large-
scale collective cases and did not directly reduce the number of small-scale cases. Statisti-
cally speaking, arbitral mediation resulted in a substantial reduction in the average scale of
collective disputes but did not directly reduce the proportion of collective cases among all
labor disputes.
These findings are theoretically, conceptually, and empirically significant. Theoretic-
ally, they explain why large-scale labor movements did not occur during China’s trans-
formation. One existing view states that workers in state-owned enterprises protested
according to the ethics of survival. They sought economic interests that would sustain
their living rather instead of civil rights. Therefore, their struggles can often be dis-
solved by temporary compensation policy by the state (Cai 2002; Chen 2000, Lee 1999).
However, it is difficult to explain why since the late 1990s the fight of workers in non-
state-owned enterprises was controlled. Another explanation stresses the corporatist
strategy of preemptive action by trade unions (Chan 1993), but this does not explain
why foreign-funded and private enterprises with weak unions also lacked labor move-
ments. One other view deems that the state actively fulfilled the rights of individual
workers during the legislative process, such as regularization of contracts, salary, work-
ing conditions, benefits, and so on, but the collective rights of forming organizations,
strikes, collective negotiations, and others are not granted to workers (Chen 2007).
However, this view cannot explain workers’ huge differences in rights protection in
terms of methods of struggle and behavior in different areas under a uniform legal
framework. After taking these factors into consideration, this work finds that all levels
of governments continuously strengthened the various mechanisms of mediation and
consolidated their own capacity for mediation, and thus successfully dispersed workers’
solidarity and dissolved their collective actions.
Conceptually, existing studies emphasize the arbitrary role of the Chinese authoritarian
state (Cai 2008). This work finds that the state has adopted mediation as a flexible chan-
neling strategy that successfully the collective struggle of workers after controlling the fac-
tor of heavy-handed repression for maintaining social stability that dominated the
committees of politics and law. Empirically, this conclusion does not agree that the
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mediation. For a long time, the repression to maintain stability that was led by committees
of politics and law did not really play a role; therefore, in recent years, governments began
to shift their methods of dealing with disputes from blocking to channeling. All levels of
governments, from central to local, were keen to promote a variety of grand mediation
mechanisms. However, many grassroots-level mediation organizations lacked sufficient
professional legal ability to handle the increasingly complicated labor disputes, resulting
in very rough and oversimplified grassroots-level mediation and leaving a large number of
labor disputes mediated but not resolved. Moreover, this kind of mediation required ex-
cessive involvement of all levels of governmental departments in labor disputes. The arbi-
trary intervention by the state neutralized the equal and institutionalized mechanism of
negotiation and consultation between employees and employers inside enterprises. Over
time, the state was required to spend a great deal of administrative resources on absorbing
a wider range of collective labor struggles. Moreover, the state’s stubborn preference of
mediation over strict regulation (such as active labor inspections, arbitration awards, the
administration of justice, and so on) will in the long run soften the binding power of labor
laws and fuel unscrupulous violations by employers. Under the circumstances of irregular
grassroots-level mediation, the absence of negotiation mechanisms between employers
and employees, excessive political mobilization of administrative resources, and long-
range suspension of coercive powers, the rights of workers were not truly protected. Me-
diation could only help obtain a temporary compromise, rather than play a fundamental
role in channeling disputes, which in turn forced the state to mediate selectively according
to the scale and intensity of collective disputes—focusing on large ones and ignoring small
ones. As a result, although statistically the average scale of collective labor disputes de-
creased due to the resolution of large-scale collective disputes, in reality, the number of
small-scale and individual disputes still remained high. The mass incidents caused by
rights-defense activities also appeared to be endless. There have been some signs that
Chinese workers have begun to seek solutions outside institutionalized relief channels and
are turning to violent approaches. This article thus insists that, in the long run, only by
enhancing the capacity to legally handle labor disputes, recognizing the collective rights
of workers, and establishing a good mutual consultation mechanism between employers
and employees can the state resolve labor disputes without mediation.
Endnotes
1Data source: Yearbook of Chinese Labor Statistics (over years).
2Data source: Yearbook of Chinese Labor Statistics (over years).
3Source: China Statistical Yearbook of Unions, China Labor Statistical Yearbook, and
China Labor Yearbook over years, and Chinese Labor Net: History and Current Situ-
ation of the Chinese Settlement System of Labor Disputes (http://www.labournet.-
com.cn/ldzy/ckzl/ckzl.asp).
4Data source: Yearbook of Chinese Labor Department over years.
5In order to expand the reach of mediation committees in enterprises, the new law
no longer regulated that mediation committees had to be represented by three parties:
trade unions, representatives of enterprises, and representatives of workers. Instead,
they are composed of only two parties: representatives of workers and representatives
of enterprises. In particular, the former has to be elected by all employees or by
Zhuang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2015) 2:7 Page 23 of 25members of trade unions. This adjustment was a response to both the dependency of
trade unions on enterprises and the weakness of mediators in real situations. It also re-
flects the fact that the state wants mediation committees to reach enterprises that were
not covered by trade unions.
6In order to avoid the situation in which workers took protests outside of the institu-
tionalized relief channels due to the inability of arbitral institutes and the lengthy arbi-
tration proceedings, the Law of Mediation and Arbitration further expanded the scope
of admission. In terms of content, the new law also explicitly included disputes on pay-
ment for labor, medical expenses related to work injury, economic compensation, and
so on in the scope of acceptance. In regard to timeliness, the new law also extended
the valid length of time from 60 days to 1 year. These adjustments laid a systematic
foundation for more broadly absorbing the actions of workers’ struggles.
7It should be noted that the admitted collective disputes by arbitral institutes may not
reflect the severity of collective labor conflicts in China’s transition for the reason that
many conflicts occurred before or after arbitration proceedings. Moreover, arbitral medi-
ation could not represent the nationwide capacity of mediation because there was a large
number of labor disputes mediated by mediation committees within enterprises, people’s
mediation committees inside village (neighborhood) committees, the judicial offices at the
basic level, social security stations of villages, towns, and streets, and governmental courts
at all levels. Subject to the availability of data published by officials, this study can only
examine the effect of pre-court mediation, either arbitral or extra-arbitral, on the cases of
collective disputes that were formally arbitrated. Even if the impact of these mediation
mechanisms passed the test, it only showed that they inhibited collective labor disputes
within arbitral and relief channels, but did not reflect that they effectively resolved collect-
ive labor disputes during China’s transition. However, as mentioned before, the principle
of “mediation first” that was implemented throughout the channels of institutionalized re-
lief aimed at preventing workers from taking collective actions while seeking (quasi-)judi-
cial remedies at the same time. The rights protection actions of Chinese people did not
take place in an either-or setting between judicial remedies and collective actions; they
often had to resort to both collective actions and judicial help in order to catch the atten-
tion of governments (O’Brien & Li 2004).
8It should be noted that the main objects of mediation committees in enterprises and
arbitral mediation were relatively separated. Respectively, they were labor disputes in
state-owned and non-state-owned sectors. As discussed in previous literature and his-
torical analysis, a large difference existed between those two types of disputes in terms
of the people involved, attributes, and governments’ responses.
9The data related to mediation prior to 1999 has too many missing values and thus
cannot be analyzed.
10Each province may have some properties that did not change over time. Each year
may also have some national-level variation (such as the legislation of new labor laws).
These characteristics and changes may simultaneously affect the capability of arbitral me-
diation and the scale and frequency of collective labor disputes. For example, one of the
most important effects from one year may be the Law of Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration in 2008 that changed the definition of collective labor disputes, increasing the
number of workers from “three or more” to “more than ten.” This work sets the year vari-
able as a fixed effect to solve this problem, which could affect the estimates in this paper.
Zhuang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2015) 2:7 Page 24 of 2511The proportion of collective labor disputes admitted by labor arbitral institutes de-
clined dramatically since 2006, which may be related to the use of grand mediation.
New mediators such as people’s mediation committees, judicials, and other grassroots
organizations of comprehensive management and stability maintenance filtered a por-
tion of collective cases for arbitral institutes. However, there does not currently exist
any provincial data on the mediation performance of these organizations, and thus,
they could not be included in the model of this work. This limitation needs to be ad-
dressed after the release of new data.
12The demonstration effect has actually been solved by controlling the occurrence of
labor complaints in the analysis of the current period.
13Due to the limited sample size, the standard errors of one-step and two-step esti-
mation may be underestimated. This work thus adopts the method of finite-sample es-
timation to overcome that problem, providing an estimate of the t statistic instead of
the commonly used z statistic.
14GMM also requires that residuals are sequentially independent in the second order.
This can be verified by the AR test with a null hypothesis that no serial correlation exists.
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